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Abstract
This article discusses the use of law and order discours-
es, agents and institutions in the management of the 
protest. Social movement studies literature on the police 
management of the protest and the effects this has on 
mobilization is reviewed to this end. Notions from the so-
ciology of punishment are incorporated in order to argue 
for the pertinence of exploring these issues in terms of 
processes of penalization. A complex vision of punish-
ment is used to question the widespread understanding 
that there is now less violence involved in protest man-
agement: I turn to symbolic violence, and spectators as 
interpreters of penalization to open new lines of inquiry. 
To illustrate the types of situation for which these con-
ceptual shifts might productively be applied I refer to ex-
amples of mediated political discourse, police action and 
presence, and the modification and application of legal 
texts during the last wave of protest in Spain.
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Resumen
Este artículo plantea una discusión conceptual sobre 
la gestión de la protesta a través de las instancias vin-
culadas con la ley y el orden. Para ello, primero se re-
pasan los estudios que prestan atención a la gestión 
policial de la protesta y sus efectos en la movilización. 
Se plantea la pertinencia de usar nociones provenien-
tes de la sociología del castigo y plantear esta 
cuestión en términos de procesos de penalización. 
Este enfo-que se usa para cuestionar la idea de que 
ahora hay menos violencia en la gestión de la 
protesta. Para ello recurro a la noción de violencia 
simbólica y propongo prestar más atención a los 
espectadores como un ob-jetivo de la penalización. 
Para ilustrar estas propuestas se utilizan ejemplos del 
discurso político mediatizado, de la actuación y 
presencia policial y de la modificación y aplicación de 
textos legales durante la última ola de protestas en 
España.
Palabras Clave
Bourdieu; castigo; Durkheim; movimientos 
sociales; represión.
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Over the last decade an international wave of pro-
test against neoliberal policies has taken place (della 
Porta, 2015), indeed, in countries like Spain there 
were also political crises, crises that were actually 
about the particular way in which politics had been 
institutionalized (see Díez and Laraña 2017; Portos 
2016). Young people were the protagonists of a good 
part of social mobilizations in Spain. These people 
had been unable to participate in the configuration of 
the parliamentary monarchy negotiated in the tran-
sition to democracy. For a number of reasons (Ro-
manos 2011: 334-335), while the mobilization of a 
generation previously perceived to be apathetic and 
depoliticized came as a surprise, so too did the gov-
ernment’s reaction and that of several official bod-
ies, whose way of handling the protest was, in many 
senses, at odds with a healthy democratic system. 
This article sets out to contribute to the theoretical 
discussion by analysing three aspects of this way of 
handling the protest, which resorted to institutions 
and discourses more typical of crime management 
(mediated political discourse, police action and pres-
ence, and changing laws).
With this work, I hope to contribute to the concep-
tual discussion on the relationship between the state 
and social movements. Even though this approach 
may be reductive (Earl 2011: 262-263; Ferree 2004: 
86-87), I will concentrate on the state mechanisms 
linked to crime management at demonstrations. This 
is mainly because I am interested in focusing on pun-
ishment. To do this, writing from the perspective of 
sociology of punishment, I take social movements 
out of the spotlight and leave them in the periphery 
for a time, focusing instead on state action, particu-
larly punitive state action. I aim to take into account 
the actions of government, legislators and police, but 
not only because of how this can contribute to the un-
derstanding of social movements, their opportunities 
for success, or the internal restructuring they entail; 
I think that temporarily taking a broader perspective 
brings elements to light that may be of use to the lit-
erature on repression and social movements, even if 
this is only in terms of the type of empirical material 
that can be used to study repression (Oliver 2008: 
19). In this article I propose three shifts in relation to 
the most common approaches.
Firstly, I shift the focus from physical violence to 
symbolic violence. There is a consensus that a re-
duction or softening in the use of physical violence 
by the state (especially the police) has taken place, 
but this does not necessarily mean that the state 
uses less violence. As I argue below, the state ap-
pears to be increasingly resorting to forms of sym-
bolic violence. In light of this, a broader perspective 
on the police must be adopted, along with a wider 
understanding of the agents and institutions involved 
and of the forms this violence takes, forms which are 
increasingly being linked to communication process-
es and social categorization. Although my focus lies 
in and around the protest, I intend to suggest some 
of the benefits of taking things that happen outside 
demonstrations into account. 
Secondly, due to the increase in symbolic vio-
lence, I suggest that characterizing state action as 
repressive, although this is still fair, may involve un-
derestimating its productive effects. Seeing the con-
trol of protests as repression alone makes sense if 
we are interested in its impact on collective action. 
However, if we hypothesize, following Durkheim, that 
punishment is not oriented primarily towards the so-
cial movement (who are more likely to be conquered 
than convinced by threats and repression) but rath-
er at those people who do not have the police after 
them, we can take into account the impact repression 
has on those who watch as spectators. This third shift 
involves considering the effect of the penalization of 
the protest on spectators.
In order to explore some of these ideas and high-
light the potential advantages of the approach pro-
posed, this article focuses on the wave of protests 
that took place in Spain from 2011 to 2014: bring-
ing into dialogue with each other academic sources, 
newspaper articles, statements from politicians, and 
analyses of the legal changes introduced.
The study of state repression 
and social movements
Repression and mobilization
Repression has been an object of study in social 
movement studies for some time, but the amount of 
conceptual development and empirical attention paid 
to it has varied. Since the 70s at least, influential au-
thors such as Charles Tilly (1978) emphasized the 
state repression of social movements and the links 
between this and different political regimes, however, 
for the most part, this topic did not begin to receive 
close attention until the 90s (Tarrow 2011: 28). The re-
newed attention paid to repression is largely attribut-
ed to the publication of a series of works by Donatella 
della Porta (1996; della Porta and Reiter 1998). Della 
Porta highlighted the relevance of studying specific 
aspects of states’ responses to protest. To this end 
she focused on one specific variable (“police han-
dling of protest events”) as an indicator of the State’s 
openness to the demands of social movements. As a 
methodological strategy, della Porta focuses on one 
type of state agent (the police) and a specific event 
(demonstration / protest). Thus, the models for police 
management of demonstrations were systematically 
studied as an indicator of the structure of political op-
portunities, and in order to show the direct effects 
that they had on the form and development of the 
demonstrations and of the social movements them-
selves (della Porta 1996: 62-66).
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This line of research has produced a good amount 
of empirical material, primarily in the form of case 
studies. Some have taken on the task of proposing 
which factors or variables influence the police control 
of the protest to attempt to understand what shapes 
different police actions, while others have focused 
on the effects of this police action on movements, in 
what could be referred to as the literature on the rela-
tionships between repression and mobilization (Dav-
enport 2005). There have been all sorts of results: 
linear results (repression increases mobilization, re-
pression diminishes mobilization), curvilinear results 
(in the form of a U and an inverted U) and unclear 
results (usually where two opposing tendencies - mo-
bilization and demobilization - cancel each other out) 
(see Earl 2011: 266-268). These results are very use-
ful for homing in on the contingent and political nature 
of the effects of the police control of demonstrations, 
but it does not seem that scientific laws and patterns 
can be expected to establish univocal relationships 
between variables in this area.
On the concept of repression
Conceptually, however, della Porta’s operational-
ization (which is reasonable from a methodological 
perspective) seems to have led to a rather narrow 
understanding of the state response to the protest, 
which largely focuses on the face-to-face interaction 
between police and protesters (Earl 2011: 265; Oliver 
2008: 3-4). So, despite the fact that della Porta her-
self (1996: 62-66) introduces repression as one of the 
many elements to be studied in relation to the police 
management of political dissidence (taken as an indi-
cator of the state’s degree of openness to the demands 
of social movements), coercion at demonstrations and 
its effects on the development of social movements is 
the main issue to have been investigated. 
Others have purposely tried to escape the notion 
of repression. For example, Jennifer Earl (2006) pro-
posed replacing the term repression (which she con-
siders to be biased and centred on the protesters’ 
perspective) with the “social control of the protest”. 
This concept is supposed to accommodate the study 
of the less direct forms of control, take non-state ac-
tors into account, and extend the temporal scope to 
what happens before and after demonstrations.1 Earl 
proposes that paying attention to who exercises this 
control, how it is exercised, and its level of visibility is 
necessary to achieve this end. In this way she hopes 
to surpass approaches that reduce this phenomenon 
to whether it poses a threat or offers an opportunity to 
social movements (which indeed, accounts for most of 
the research in this field). In what follows, I attempt to 
bring these approaches into communion with contribu-
tions from the sociology of punishment in the hope that 
this might help rethink some of the main components 
of social movement studies literature and the sites and 
processes considered pertinent to it2.
On the reduction of state vio-
lence: symbolic violence
The reduction of the use of physical and le-
thal violence
The literature that has dealt with the police control 
of the protest unanimously points to the discontinua-
tion in the use of lethal weapons (pistols, for exam-
ple) in favour of the use of other weapons that do not 
normally cause death (tear gas and rubber bullets). 
This process, primarily put into practice after World 
War II, has been accompanied by changes in the way 
the police deal with demonstrations, shifting from a 
reactive protest control model to a protest manage-
ment model that involves less aggression (Marx 
1998; della Porta and Reiter 1998). Simply put, these 
changes to the police’s way of dealing with protests, 
the weapons they can use, and the conditions for this 
use, have led to a soft-policing protest control model, 
which differs from the previous model, now described 
as hard-policing.
Objections to this assumption can also be found: 
some studies indicate that police action depends pri-
marily on the aggressiveness of the protesters, and 
that, therefore, aggressive police control continues to 
exist depending on the demonstrations (Soule and 
Davenport 2009: 16), and other, more nuanced stud-
ies suggest the coexistence of both policing models 
within the same demonstration being used at differ-
ent times and against different types of protesters, in 
a process of selective incapacitation (Blay 2013; del-
la Porta and Reiter 1998: 8). Still others point out that 
given the hyperincarceration of the African-American 
population in the wake of the civil rights movements, 
it is difficult to argue that social movements are being 
subjected to a softer form of control when imprison-
ment directly prevents the articulation of groups (Oli-
ver 2008) and even, at a more basic level, excludes 
people from political citizenship by not allowing them 
to vote in elections (Uggen and Manza 2002). This 
article, in line with these studies, is concerned with 
what is being taken into account in discussions on 
the control and repression of the protest.
This analysis of the police handling of the protest 
does not cast any doubt on the existence of state vio-
lence, but rather takes note of how qualitative chang-
es have led to a reduction in the use of institutional 
violence and of the fact that although police control 
may be heightened (due to more technologies capa-
ble of identifying people, for example), in general it 
is less violent (or resorts to dialogue more frequently 
and to lethal weapons less so).
I am interested in the type of violence being dis-
cussed, where the relationship between the state 
and the control of dissidence is said to be less vio-
lent these days. Approaching the question in terms 
of whether the management of political dissidence 
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is more or less violent nowadays can be very per-
tinent. However, this approach can be blind to other 
processes that are not as obvious, and even uses of 
violence that are not identified as such. These uses 
of violence influence both directly and indirectly the 
articulation of the protest (one of the concerns in the 
literature), as well as the conception and understand-
ing of the movement itself, and thus of its demands. 
Moreover, retaking the idea of della Porta, they can 
be a good indicator for understanding the state and 
its relationship with citizens.
The transformation of violence
The work of Norbert Elias (1939) on the historical 
transformation of the accepted forms of violence may 
be of use here. Indeed, Elias relates the pacification 
of public space to the formation of modern states 
and their attempts to gain monopoly on violence. He 
notes that the state uses the threat of violence to dis-
suade non-state actors from using violence, and how 
that transforms relationships between groups and 
sublimates violence in socially acceptable forms (for 
example, the use of table manners in court society).
The historically changing nature of the sensitivities 
that determine whether violence is considered ac-
ceptable or not has already been incorporated into 
to the study of punishment, most famously by Pieter 
Spierenburg (1984) and John Pratt (2002), and is 
considered one of the main currents in the sociol-
ogy of punishment (see Garland 1990: 213-247). Al-
though it has been most fruitfully applied in historical 
analyses, i.e. the journey from public executions to 
the use of the prison, it can also serve to understand 
the transformations of police powers. One important 
issue highlighted by Elias is the significance of visibil-
ity, and some studies have applied this to punishment 
to explain the rise of punishments that are less visible 
(like the prison). Today, for example, some acts, like 
the police stopping and searching somebody, can be 
considered legitimate and non-violent if performed 
behind doors or at police stations, their visibility be-
ing what determines whether they are deemed “civi-
lized” or not. This sensitivity, and the need to trans-
form practices and language stemming from it, may 
contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the 
transformations of state violence in its dealings with 
social movements. It can make it easier to trace these 
transformations, as this violence can be perpetuated 
in ways that are considered acceptable and it does 
not seem violent to us.
In this regard, the scope and the presence of the 
media with its capacity to report on what happens at 
demonstrations visually, is understood to have had a 
considerable influence on the transformation of po-
lice models, the selection of weapons (Marx 1998: 
257) and the increase in undercover police interven-
tions. The fact that police actions that are usually un-
seen have been made visible could have something 
to do with the transformation of the police control of 
the protest, imposing serious restrictions (legal and 
cultural) on police action. Nevertheless, other factors 
are also involved, such as a heightened perception 
of the legitimacy of protest, the development of in-
stitutional channels for the protest, and the fact that 
protesters employ less aggressive means (Soule 
and Davenport 2009). Thus, Elias’ works can help 
increase our awareness of socially acceptable forms 
of violence which, in fact, we do not always perceive 
as violent.
Symbolic violence
In this sense, I find Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of 
symbolic violence particularly useful. The term refers 
to those forms of violence that are not recognized as 
such, and that actually get their strength from the fact 
that they are not identified or perceived (Bourdieu 
1997; 1977). Symbolic violence, above all, works at 
the level of perception, no deliberate attempt is made 
to “hide” repressive acts: it is part of the relationships 
of domination, and takes its strength from the struc-
tural homology between social conditions and the 
representation that is made of them (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant 1992: 39-41). Our way of understanding 
actions, which involves applying schemes and men-
tal dispositions formed and acquired from within re-
lationships of domination, and which tend to repre-
sent those relationships as natural, makes it difficult 
to perceive certain conducts as violent, to the extent 
that they are not violent in practical terms.
Using the concept of symbolic violence makes it 
is easier to observe the productive nature of punish-
ment, which is sometimes just as important as the 
repressive one, as well as its material and symbolic 
components (González-Sánchez 2017: 70-73). The 
social movement studies literature tends to focus on 
repression (Earl 2006: 129), and this may be appro-
priate for the research objectives in question. How-
ever, within the sociology of punishment, studies into 
the productive effects of punitive state action have 
produced results that are just as fruitful as studies 
into repressive effects (for instance, disciplined bod-
ies, urban architecture, moral panic, and concepts 
for tackling social problems). Perhaps combining the 
study of productive effects with the study of repres-
sion can elucidate types of violence and effects of the 
state control of political dissidence that may be being 
undervalued.
This is not a question about opposing repression 
to production, but of understanding that they act in-
tertwined in an overlap of material and symbolic el-
ements. An analytically timely separation may over-
shadow the fact that when a police officer bashes a 
protester with a truncheon, the material repression 
of an individual takes place alongside the symbolic 
production of a social category that makes it more 
likely for other people to interpret the event in a given 
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way. This social category is not automatically and un-
equivocally imposed on the whole world. The blow 
may subsequently be subject to usage by both sides 
(police and protesters) in a struggle over the meaning 
of the act (police abuse against peaceful protesters 
or proportionate use of force against violent radicals) 
(Bourdieu 1982: 88; 1977: 94), but it is important to 
remember that they do not have the same capacity to 
have their discourse accepted as the “official” version 
of the event.
So, it might be useful to stop talking about repres-
sion and use a broader concept. David Garland pro-
poses using the concept of “penality” to refer to “the 
complex of laws, processes, discourses and institu-
tions” related to criminalization processes (Garland 
1990: 10). This makes it possible to concentrate on 
all police activity, not just repressive interventions, 
and on the use of the penal system in terms that 
go beyond police-protester interaction. The idea of 
“penality” refers, in descriptive terms, to the use of 
agents of the penal system and discourses associat-
ed with crime and delinquency to manage a situation. 
Thus, the use and presence of police at demonstra-
tions may be justified by the existence of temporary 
potential disruptions to order and legality, but this 
does not mean that penalization is not taking place 
(this depends to a certain extent on the justification 
offered for the police presence and their disposition, 
as well as how protestors are categorised); in fact 
using the term penalization can be positive in ana-
lytical terms. Just as drugs can be managed through 
medicalization, or education, or penality, political dis-
sidence expressed at demonstrations and collective 
actions may receive different political responses. If 
procedures associated with crime and its control are 
used to handle protests (though it is unusual for them 
to be used exclusively, since protests rarely obtain an 
answer from just one part of the bureaucratic field), 
the penalization process, which is more extensive 
and complex than police intervention, ought to be 
studied (and let us not forget that not all police inter-
ventions are penalizing in and of themselves).
The study of repression (particularly in its mate-
rial form) has been remarkably thorough and has 
produced fruitful insights and knowledge. Without 
denying its importance, indeed, while emphasizing 
it, I focus more on the symbolic violence than on 
the physical. Just as the existence of the media can 
foster restrictions to the types and quantity of state 
physical violence exerted on social movements, it 
also facilitates the use of new forms of symbolic vio-
lence and penalization on social movements.3 This is 
particularly important when you consider that sym-
bolic power operates at the level of knowledge and 
perception, rather than on physical bodies (Bourdieu 
1977: 91-92). Thus, developing the study of broader 
forms of penalization and their communicative effects 
appears advisable. So too does studying the specta-
tors (though this is often absent from the literature) 
since they are crucial for an understanding of the 
penalization and mobilization strategies adopted (in 
terms of the forms they take and in order to better 
understand their meaning).
The penalization of protesters 
in democratic regimes
State violence in a democracy should not be used 
against people for expressing, defending or pursu-
ing political ideas unless this involves committing 
criminal acts. As democratic values are established 
in a society, the sensitivity about what is accept-
able violence in the management of demonstrations 
changes: rendering inacceptable the use of physical 
violence, or the penalization of a group, where this is 
perceived to be because of its political ideas.
Social categorization and mediated political 
discourse
Symbolic violence mainly acts at a cognitive level, 
and at the level of understanding. In this case, the 
state stands out with its unequalled power of nomi-
nation, both in terms of issuing official classifications 
(i.e. identity cards, qualifications and criminal sen-
tences) and in terms of the production of discourses 
(Bourdieu 1982: 67-71).4 Because this sort of vio-
lence owes its strength to the fact that it is not usually 
recognized as such, it may reasonably be expected 
to be less costly to the government, since it does not 
clash with people’s sensitivities regarding what is and 
is not allowed to the same degree. Approaches that 
relate the use of state violence against social move-
ments to its high political cost could potentially ben-
efit from taking this into account.
Tools from social movement studies literature can 
be of use in the study of these processes, of which 
framing is probably the most commonly applied (see 
Benford and Snow 2000), and its importance was ac-
knowledged early on (della Porta 1996: 64-65). Some 
say that framings tend to work because they reso-
nate with cognitive dispositions (Oliver and Johnston 
2000: 41): that is, historical interpretation schemes 
that are internalized differently by people accord-
ing to their social position and trajectory, which also 
predispose them towards action, and may prevent 
certain potentially violent assertions from being per-
ceived as such, or enable them to go unnoticed. The 
literature has largely applied framing to the activity 
of social movements. Below I propose the relevance 
of studying government discourses and actions (see 
Noakes and Johnston 2005: 18-19), especially state 
punishment, as a collective action frame of particu-
lar effectiveness, because it has much credibility (its 
word is what makes things “official”) and because it 
represents the community through acts of delegation 
(Bourdieu 2012). Given the scope and focus of this 
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Another aspect of the framing process has to do 
with prognosis, and it is directly linked to the fact that 
the government set out to use agents and institu-
tions linked to law and order, in both discourse and 
practice. The solution offered points to the nature of 
the problem (criminal, non-political), and the nature 
of the social movement is insinuated. This effort to 
reconceptualize the legitimate interlocutor as dan-
gerous and, indeed, linked to crime and delinquen-
cy, does away with the need to sit down to discuss 
the content of the demands of a social movement, 
as there is but one appropriate response to crime: 
law and order. Thus, by means of the application of 
a securitarian logic, a deeply political movement is 
depoliticized (Hirst 1975: 220).
Changing how a group of people is perceived can 
be particularly difficult and costly, and sometimes, 
as this is an active process, it is not successful. In 
these cases, another subject of dispute, in which 
state agents and institutions make efforts to impose 
meaning, revolves around what these citizens do, as 
opposed to what these people “really” are. For exam-
ple, in the case of specific collective actions, political 
discourse in the media often uses a frame relating to 
the motivations of the protesters. The most signifi-
cant case can be seen in relation to the 25 Septem-
ber 2012 action called “Surround Congress”, which 
was a symbolic action to signal the perceived crisis of 
citizenship. The government representative referred 
to it as a violent act and a “disguised coup d’état” 
days before the action, and this served as a frame 
that, in addition to trying to transform the action of the 
protesters (from peaceful protest to coup d’état), also 
transformed the subsequent police actions (starting 
with a justification of the presence of 1,350 riot police 
and the subsequent dispersion of protestors using 
violent physical means) (see Fernández de Mostey-
rín 2012: 1142-1143). Another noteworthy case in 
the period was that of the escraches (where groups 
would call impromptu protests to target powerful in-
dividuals rather than institutions) which appeared 
represented in warlike terms and compared to Nazi 
tactics (Seijas 2015: 80).
It is also interesting to pay close attention to the 
conceptualization of police actions: where images 
show police striking citizens, police actions can be 
defined as non-violent, for example, by using euphe-
misms from legal-bureaucratic language: “the appli-
cation of regulatory measures”, “proportionate use 
of force”, or the classic “responses to assaults” from 
“violent protestors” (where, in the act of legitimizing 
police action, protesters are delegitimated). The use 
of euphemistic language associated with the law or 
professional practice acts as a sort of circular justi-
fication of the actions of those professionals and is 
characteristic of the operation of penality (see Cohen 
1985: 394-399). Thus, when someone says, “a po-
liceman hit me,” the answer “their use of force was 
article, only some of the framing processes will be 
set out in order to offer examples of how penality can 
work to exert symbolic violence over a social move-
ment. Non-discursive messages (such as police 
presence or the application of one set of laws instead 
of others) are to be discussed below, but here I will 
focus on mediated political discourse.
Even so, in democracy “citizens doing politics” are 
“non-suitable enemies” (Maroto Calatayud 2016: 61). 
One important framing process of the dozens identi-
fied in the literature, relates to the discussion about 
who the others are, and in the case of Spain, this ap-
pears to be based on adversarial framing (Benford 
and Snow 2000: 616). So, significant efforts appear 
to have been made to define protesters as “suitable 
enemies”, and in order to achieve this, protestors are 
denied the possibility of self-definition and instead the 
term “anti-establishment” has been bandied about, 
placing them outside the democratic playing field and 
attempting to remove them from the collective us. In 
this way, a process that tries to alter what protestors 
are takes place. At the Indignados demonstrations the 
extra vulnerability of young people to these processes 
and their scarce symbolic capital for countering them 
was evident: in order to discredit a fairly broad move-
ment with an unusually high diversity amongst protest-
ers (see Calvo et al. 2011) “anti-establishment youths” 
were constantly alluded to. This sometimes involved 
going to extreme lengths, such as associating some 
of the main associations of the protest cycle with ETA 
(with terrorism). It was even suggested that protestors 
were trying to kill police officers.5
It is important not to confuse framing processes 
with ideologies (Oliver and Johnston 2000). One good 
example to illuminate this issue, in which a one-off dis-
pute takes on a much wider meaning, is the framing 
process around Spain’s existing democracy. Through 
the recourse and appeal to 1978 (the year the consti-
tution that underpins and consecrates the transition 
process was approved), the protesters, on the one 
hand, and the politicians, on the other, located their 
disputes in a much broader struggle: that of the dem-
ocratic model itself. Although both sides accepted this 
framing, the frames used to refer to it and describe it 
indicated strong ideological differences. On the one 
hand, the demonstrators referred to “ending the re-
gime of 78” (which calls to mind the significant con-
tinuities between Franco’s regime and the transition) 
(Díez y Laraña 2017: 232-238), while the government 
referred to the “spirit of 78” (which usually refers to 
dialogue, consensus and non-confrontation). These 
framings were supposed to amplify the dispute and 
transform it into a broader discussion (Benford and 
Snow 2000: 624). In addition, they appeal to the emo-
tional and community feelings fundamental to mobi-
lization (Goodwin et al. 2000: 22) that can make the 
communicative function of penality more effective, as 
I explore in relation to Durkheim later on.
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proportionate” involves a mere change of conceptual 
frame that, nevertheless, seems to justify a violent 
act through denial, despite the fact that this is merely 
being redefined in bureaucratic language.
Thus, whether certain actions are violent or not is 
under dispute, and it is easy to see that it does not 
depend on the actions themselves: an act may be 
violent when carried out by citizens and something 
else when the police do it. It is my view that analyti-
cally it would be beneficial to treat this legitimate vio-
lence as violence in order to better understand both 
the police and the protesters. In this regard, much is 
to be gained from paying more attention to C. Wright 
Mills’ “vocabularies of motives” that are present in 
state actions linked to punishment (Melossi 1990: 
205-211).
All this appears to indicate that into the Span-
ish debate about public policy, the state model, and 
representative democracy, the government has at-
tempted to impose a master frame based on crime, 
that uses a signifier to point to certain institutions and 
agents as the right ones to handle the protests (Oli-
ver and Johnston 2000: 50), in this case, police and 
punishment. Through allusions to the fight against 
crime and dangerous disruptive elements, less noble 
ends are pursued, such as the persecution of political 
ideas (Simon 2007: 271).
Police presence and intervention
It is also worth bearing in mind that police pres-
ence itself communicates: it comes with very visible 
symbols, from uniform colour to riot police militariza-
tion. The presence of these symbols has cognitive 
and emotional resonances for the dispositions we ac-
quire. This provides the police with symbolic power to 
define actions, people, and situations that does not 
require the coercive use of power (whether physi-
cal or not) and that, in fact, is not perceived as such 
(Loader 1997: 3). The police have an almost unparal-
leled capacity to define a group of people as suspi-
cious with their presence (although their mere pres-
ence may not be enough as it is always interpreted 
within its cultural and political context). Police display 
and their deployment form part of their presence - 
this is particularly true in the case of the meaning of 
riot police at protests.
The role played by the police in their dealings with 
a social movement, as I explore below, goes far be-
yond the social movement. It influences, to name one 
example, the meaning of a protest. Even where no 
physical act of violence takes place, a large police 
presence, where police appear ready for interven-
tion, helps define a group of citizens as suspicious 
and, in part, enemies of the state (that is, of the col-
lective or society).6 The huge police deployment 
around the Spanish congress in 2012 with the blue 
lights from the riot vans generated an environment 
of alarm and sent a message about the demonstra-
tion as dangerous, even before it began. That is, po-
lice presence and disposition in itself helps to define 
the nature of the political protest, in a process akin 
to what is referred to in the literature as diagnostic 
framing (Benford and Snow 2000: 615). Indeed, this 
type of symbolic violence is supported by broader 
cultural conceptions of the meaning of the police and 
their status as “the” institution for managing crime 
and handling criminals.
In addition, in a period such as 2011-2014, where 
the police are also materially supported by the state, 
which increased the budget for riot materials by more 
than 1,700% and even created a new anti-riot sup-
port force,7 the idea that the police are the appropri-
ate institution to handle protests is reinforced. Part of 
the basis for the protests themselves were the cuts 
in health and education that involved, to name one 
example, excluding 900,000 people from the right 
to medical assistance: the message sent is that, in 
times of crisis and “necessary public spending cuts,” 
hiring police is more important for the state than en-
abling access to healthcare. 
Of course, the symbolic effects of police presence 
and intervention are not automatic, their persuasive 
capacity and the meaning of the symbols in play may 
vary according to whether a person participated in 
a given demonstration or not, for example. Here I 
would like to point out that symbolic effects are par-
ticularly strong for spectators or non-participants in 
collective action. And yet, a good part of police cred-
ibility (and, therefore, the potential for categorizing 
other groups through their intervention) depends on 
consistent representations of their roles, which need 
to be in line with those assigned socially (to enforce 
and obey the law) (Goffman 1959). In an attempt 
to dispute the meaning of police actions during the 
cycle of protest studied here, protesters began up-
loading photos and videos from their phones that 
showed the severity of some of the forms of physi-
cal violence employed by the police. All in all, the 
meaning of police action is not determined. Efforts 
were thus made to respond to attempts to criminal-
ize social movements and, also, to try to devalue 
the police (in other words, to dispute their mean-
ing and question their symbolic power). The official 
response was to refuse to investigate whether riot 
police were actually acting in ways that were not 
permitted by the law, and to attempt to ban people 
from sharing images of the police. 
In the following section I discuss legal modifi-
cations relating to the penalization of the protest 
that involve criminalization (e.g. prohibition of 
the uploading of photos of a policeman hitting a 
protester) and decriminalization (such as facilitat-
ing the (already typical) police practice of forcing 
people to delete photos and videos or confiscating 
memory cards).
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The modification and application of laws
There is another resource that can be accessed 
by means of the state: the modification of legal texts. 
This ability to change the rules of the game (and not 
just to “arbitrate” disputes) is what makes the bureau-
cratic field one of the most important objectives of the 
struggle.8 Modifications can go in at least two direc-
tions. On the one hand, conducts can be penalized by 
being made illegal. Although in Spain, in principle, cer-
tain groups cannot be outright banned,9 activities as-
sociated with these groups can be prohibited, so that 
an indirect criminalization of political dissidence can 
take place. With the latest criminal and administrative 
legal reforms, up to fifteen specific actions pertaining 
to the repertoire of this wave of protest, which was on 
the whole peaceful, were banned; these included the 
temporary occupation of public buildings, moving po-
lice barriers, and using improvised routes for demon-
strations, thus reversing the historical process towards 
the decriminalization of nonviolent civil disobedience 
actions (Oliver 2008: 9). On the other hand, conducts 
can be decriminalized, for example where formerly ille-
gal police actions get legalized through “the extension 
of police powers” (including increasing the number of 
situations in which police can make arrests or allowing 
for the interception of communications without judicial 
authorization). This dynamic in which greater pow-
ers and discretion are being given to the police has 
branched out due to the tendency towards the increas-
ing use of administrative law for punishments applied 
to social movement participants.
This strategy involves shifting the penalization of 
certain conducts from the penal route to the admin-
istrative route, purportedly to remove non-serious 
conducts from criminal law in order to sanction them 
through administrative law. The result has been that, 
in a joint reform of the Penal Code and the Law of Cit-
izen Security, there are now administrative offenses 
with more punitive sanctions than crimes, but with-
out the judicial guarantees of the rule of law (Faraldo 
2014). Basically, it is a matter of modifying the sanc-
tion given for the same infraction, but without judges 
deciding on their conformity to the law, and without 
these sanctions being necessarily milder. In fact, 
judges had been dismissing most of the sanctions for 
criminal offences for social movement participants 
between 2011 and 2013 (Maroto Calatayud 2016: 
65; Maqueda Abreu 2015: 23-26). In one move, a 
judge’s intervention is practically eliminated, it be-
comes much more complicated, and the severity of 
sanctions is increased, somehow removing the sort 
of judicial opportunity structure which appeared to 
be acting in favour of protesters (Doherty and Hayes 
2014). Moreover, these reforms were used to prohibit 
conducts typical of civil disobedience, which char-
acterized the cycle of protests, involving a targeted 
criminalization (Ellefsen 2016: 448; for a specific list 
of prohibitions see Oliver and Urda 2015: 104-105).
Furthermore, the use of municipal ordinances to 
sanction conduct linked to the protest has increased. 
These ordinances are designed for problems of co-
existence or incivility, they have the lowest legal sta-
tus and their application points to a penalization that 
is avoiding judicial control. Equating the exercise of 
political activities recognized as fundamental rights 
(like the freedom of assembly and demonstration) to 
the level of annoyance activities involves the symbol-
ic degradation of political activity (Maroto Calatayud 
2016: 68). An example of this when the distribution of 
political pamphlets and the use of megaphones are 
sanctioned under an ordinance designed to sanction 
dirtying the street or loud music. This symbolic degra-
dation takes place first through punishment and sec-
ond through the use of minor ordinances. Through 
the application of certain laws over others, the fram-
ing of an activity in public space is transformed. In 
addition, where these ordinances are applied, people 
often refuse to stop carrying out their political activi-
ties, which (particularly in Spain) usually results in the 
addition of a (penal) sanction for disobedience to au-
thority (Larrauri 2007: 18).
In the case of Spain in recent years, this type of 
administrativization of punishment has been useful 
from the perspective of the government, since, along 
with the dissuasive effects it seems to have had on 
protestors, it diminished the public staging of penal-
ization through physical violence (Barkan 2006: 84), 
which was actually one of the triggers of the 15-M 
movement. Thus, under the pretext of promoting civic 
harmony and issuing minor sanctions, the fundamen-
tally political and legitimate nature of public expres-
sions of political dissidence is transformed, just as 
the meaning of urban public space as political is 
questioned and obstacles are placed in the way of its 
use (Calvo and Portos 2018; Sorando and González 
2013: 378).
For the most part the effects of these processes 
are not restricted to physical interactions or to partici-
pants in social movements. For that reason, I would 
like to recover the provocative Durkheimian notion 
that punishment and penalization processes are not 
chiefly oriented towards the repressed, but rather, 
towards the spectators (Durkheim 1893: 110), and 
from here it is easier to understand the production 
that is taking place through the criminalization of so-
cial movements.
The audience as the receptor of the 
penalization of social movements 
The point here is not to deny that penalizing social 
movements is the objective of the implementation 
of mechanisms, discourses, agents and institutions 
linked to the prevention and retribution of crime, nor 
to belittle the physical violence exerted on them. My 
claim is that other forms of violence, that are not usu-
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ally perceived as clearly as physical violence are tak-
ing place, and that taking this into account can make 
it easier to notice other processes and actors that are 
also important in the study of the state treatment of 
political dissidence in democracy (that is being linked 
to crime and punishment).
In this section, I consider the benefits of consid-
ering a third actor that is usually excluded from the 
study of the penalization of protests: the audience 
(those who do not participate directly, but who watch 
and listen). I also want to emphasise the commu-
nicative function of the penalization of demonstra-
tions, which is a factor that does not seem to enjoy 
much specific attention in social movement studies 
literature or studies about punishment. For example, 
Earl (2011: 263) identifies three effects of protest re-
pression (prevention, control and constraint), but we 
might also wish to consider the transformative effect 
that penalization can produce (changing the status 
of citizens engaged in politics into that of dangerous 
subjects or denying the political nature of collective 
action). This is what can justify direct repression in a 
democracy.
The communicative function of the penaliza-
tion of protesters
Durkheim was one of the first to adopt a sociologi-
cal approach to the study of punishment and process-
es of criminalization. Several of Durkheim’s analytical 
proposals continue to be provocative, and others, in-
cluding his suggestion that punishment does not de-
ter people from committing further crimes, now enjoy 
considerable empirical support (Garland 2018: 13). If 
this is taken seriously, the repression of social move-
ments may be understood to discourage individuals 
from participating in specific collective protest actions, 
but does not appear to change people’s way of think-
ing (here dissent is understood to be social deviance). 
Given that these deviations come from political convic-
tions and emotional implications (which are generally 
strong, since they push people to take action; Good-
win et al., 2000), it does not seem likely that people will 
change their way of thinking after being bashed.
This article does not ascribe to an essentialist view 
of deviance, but rather, following Durkheim (1893: 
75-76) I argue that it is precisely the fact that there 
is a social reaction (the intervention of the penal sys-
tem) that points to the existence of deviant behaviour. 
In this sense, following a functionalist logic, if pun-
ishment does not help prevent political dissidence, 
it seems plausible that it may not be mainly oriented 
towards demonstrators, but rather towards the audi-
ence, the non-dissidents. Thus, on seeing the reac-
tion of the state, spectators would tend to identify the 
catalyst of that reaction as a deviation and, therefore, 
as a threat to shared values (values represented by 
the state and, in particular, by penal and administra-
tive law). From this perspective, the repression of the 
protest can be read as a means to communicate to 
the rest of society that “society” is not in danger, that 
order is still in force and that everyone can return to 
their affairs without worrying about what the protest-
ers shouted about. The result expected by Durkheim 
(1893: 109), in general, is that this contributes to re-
inforcing and renewing social cohesion, even though 
this may have been at the cost of penalizing a small 
group presented as an enemy of the community.
One recent example can be found in the govern-
ment’s penalization of Catalans in the wake of the 1 
October 2017 referendum in which voting was framed 
as criminal, as opposed to political. This penaliza-
tion may have contributed to the perception, across 
Spain, of the referendum as a threat to the unity of 
Spain (which it probably was, but the penalization at-
taches a criminal meaning to it, rather than a political 
one). The punitive response comes off as the means 
of reinstating order and the notion of community (of 
“Spain”), which, like all powerful collective represen-
tations, involves religious feelings associated with the 
sacred (Durkheim 1893: 94). Only through taking this 
dimension into account can the intensity of the penal-
ization be understood. Its material objective (to stop 
people from voting), which failed, was not the only 
one. There was also a symbolic objective, which is 
better understood where this repression, although it 
was enacted materially on the voters’ bodies, is seen 
to be about telling the rest of Spain that the group’s 
cohesion is not in danger, that the government is in-
flexible and that the government is a good protector 
of the community. Moreover, punitive attitudes and 
their expression are an important element of group 
cohesion, and these are not unconnected to broader 
feelings of insecurity (Serrano Maíllo 2016).
Why the audience? 
The symbolic violence exerted on protesters has 
a tendency to depoliticize both state violence and 
social movements by hiding their political nature, by 
shifting the terrain: a democratic debate on political 
proposals is shifted into a frame of crime and illegal-
ity. I argue that a fundamental part of this is the frame 
of meaning that has been built around the protesters 
and their requests, but also around police action and 
the government. Penalization must also be treated as 
a communicative act, one with several layers (Smith 
2008: 18). The audience is not a passive subject or a 
mere recipient of messages: it interprets all messages 
actively (Gamson et al. 1992). Nevertheless, social 
movements’ messages do not have the same weight 
or dissuasive capacity as those of state institutions, es-
pecially when issues like crime and security, so full of 
meanings and emotions, are involved. The usefulness 
of the Durkheimian frame for understanding these pro-
cesses related to punishment has been pointed out, 
albeit alongside the important contributions of Bakhtin, 
Barthes and Douglas (Smith 2008: 25-29).
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As indicated above, emphasis is placed on spec-
tators in this article without denying the importance 
of social movement participants. Symbolic violence 
may not be fundamental in terms of increase and de-
crease in mobilization (at least in the short term), but 
it is important with regards to the meaning of protest 
and state action. In this contest between two collec-
tive actors, the audience often appears as a judge 
that grants varying degrees of support and this can 
have very significant consequences for the outcome 
of a political contest (Turner 1969). In fact, the de-
gree of violence and institutionalization of the protest 
affects the amount of support social movements re-
ceive (della Porta and Diani 2006: 230-231). Thus, 
studying the processes behind the penalization of the 
protest may offer insights. Take, for example, cases 
in which the government makes it harder for people 
to exercise institutionalized forms of protest (for ex-
ample, attacking the right to protest) and constructs 
a meaning that links protesting to violence and dis-
ruption. In this same act, the violence exercised is 
legitimated to the point that this violent management 
of political dissidence in democracy can be denied 
(and framed as a reaction to criminals against whom 
the government cannot but resort to the law).
The use of symbolic violence through penaliza-
tion is relevant to an understanding of the potential 
success or failure of the repression of political dis-
sidence or of making institutional changes in line with 
the demands of a social movement. In addition, it me-
diates the meaning of both protest and repression, 
and therefore may be of use in the interpretation of 
the varied results from research on mobilization and 
repression, as I hope the examples presented in this 
paper may suggest.
Conclusions 
This article proposes approaching the repression 
of social movements from the sociology of punish-
ment in order to delve into the connections between 
“the control of crime and the control of social move-
ments” (Oliver 2008: 4). Less explicitly, it also at-
tempts to demonstrate the importance of studying 
protests in order to better understand the dynam-
ics of punishment (Simon and Sparks 2013: 7). The 
notion of repression, which is problematized in the 
literature (see Earl 2011; 2006), has been the main 
point addressed along with the need to observe pe-
nalization as a productive - as well as a repressive - 
process involving different forms of violence, not just 
the physical. 
To this end, the idea that the use of state violence 
to control protests has decreased is questioned and 
a proposal to explore forms of symbolic violence (see 
Bourdieu 1977) is put forward. I, then, propose using 
the term “penality” to take into account the complex-
ity of discourses, practices and institutions linked to 
crime and its solutions (Garland 1990: 10) and “pe-
nalization” as the process by which a problem (here, 
political dissidence) is dealt with by these agents and 
institutions, rather than, for example, those special-
ized in the discussion of political ideas or the promo-
tion of citizen participation in a democracy.
To try to illustrate some benefits of approaching 
the problem in this way, this article has explored three 
aspects from the recent Spanish cycle of protest: dis-
course, the police, and legality. In relation to the first 
one, examples have been given of attempts to ne-
gate the political nature of social movements and to 
link them to illegal intentions or actions, so as to deny 
them recognition as valid political interlocutors and 
apply law and order policies. Regarding the second, I 
pointed out the communicative importance of choos-
ing to resort to the police, as well as the type of police 
presence, in the framing of the demonstrations - and 
the demonstrators - as a risk activity. In relation to 
the third, attention has been drawn to the intensive 
law changing activity in Spain that has criminalized 
some conducts and decriminalized others, and to the 
use of administrative laws to punish political activity 
in public space.
In light of these observations, I try to emphasize 
punishment’s communicative function towards those 
not participating in social movements. This can con-
tribute to a better understanding of some of the strat-
egies used to manage the demands of social move-
ments and, perhaps, the empirical relations observed 
between repression and mobilization. Some Dur-
kheimian notions about punishment are employed to 
this end and I argue that these notions are particu-
larly important given that not many social institutions 
possess the capacity of punishment to unify and im-
passion (Garland 1983: 53).
However, the importance of punishment does not 
lie in communication and physical repression alone. 
The fundamental significance of punishment is po-
litical, and penality’s given forms and interventions 
can be linked to transformations in the political field. 
In the last wave of protest it seems clear that, at 
least for social movements, the context of the neo-
liberalization of public policies and state structure 
was fundamental, particularly for the content of pro-
tests and some of their dynamics. In fact, this has 
been described as a good opportunity to better un-
derstand the relationships between the political situ-
ation and social movements, and attention has been 
drawn to how this last wave of mobilization reveals a 
crisis of political legitimation (which was principally 
caused by the neoliberal policies themselves) (della 
Porta 2015: 111-112). I would like to conclude by 
drawing attention to the possibility that the criminal-
ization of the protest is itself one of the responses 
that neoliberal political philosophy has made to this 
crisis, and that this offers a solution that is symbolic 
as well as material. 
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The management of protests against neoliberal-
ism itself was part of shaping the neoliberal state, 
both in terms of its composition and the functions it 
is attributed (it is not there to provide education or la-
bour rights, but to guarantee that the law is complied 
with). The expansion of the penal system has been 
described as necessary for the implementation of 
neoliberal policies (Wacquant 2009), and this article 
explored a good example of how resistance to these 
policies is dealt with by government responses that 
take advantage of this situation to symbolically reaf-
firm the functions of the state and materially bolster 
the budgets of certain public institutions (González-
Sánchez and Maroto-Calatayud 2018).
Like any political process, this is contentious, so 
I am not attempting to argue that, whatever social 
movements do, neoliberalism is reinforced. In fact, 
in the openly political confrontations characteristic of 
social movements’ relationships with governments, 
social movements sometimes manage to frame the 
dispute around the political and arbitrary nature of 
certain state measures. These disputes are particu-
larly important because punishment influences the 
understanding of protest and the statu quo, since it 
provides strong foundations for the production of the 
meanings and categories of appreciation that shape 
aspects of (democratic) culture (Garland 1990: 252). 
Thus, understanding penality better can help im-
prove our understanding of the space in which social 
movements are born, grow old and die. The ways in 
which protests are handled by (democratic) govern-
ments transmit ideas about what protesting means, 
and these meanings are fundamental in the political 
socialization of young people. The penalization of 
demonstrations is not merely a matter of sociological 
interest. The youth of today are the politicians, police-
men, judges and citizens of tomorrow.
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Notes
1. Tarrow (2011: 170) prefers the term “suppression” to 
refer to processes that do not include physical coer-
cion. Ferree (2004: 88) uses soft-repression to denote 
the “mobilization of non-violent means to silence or 
eradicate oppositional ideas”.
2. Earl’s notion of “social control” appears somewhat 
problematic because of the long connotations that this 
concept has in sociology –beyond ‘formal’ and ‘infor-
mal’ social control (see Janowitz 1975). In addition, 
these mechanisms do much more than “control”; they 
transform the protest, influence political culture, com-
municate moral values and bolster and create social 
categories (Garland 1990: 10).
3. I am not suggesting here that physical and symbolic 
violence are in a zero-sum game.
4. Bourdieu paraphrases Weber to say that the state 
(claims for itself) “‘monopoly of legitimate physical 
and symbolic violence’, inasmuch as the monopoly 
of symbolic violence is the condition for possession 
of the exercise of the monopoly of physical violence 
itself” (2012: 4). Needless to say, State violence is not 
neutral.
5. “Cifuentes afirma que la PAH ha manifestado su 
apoyo al entorno de ETA” [Cifuentes confirms that the 
PAH showed support for ETA] (El País, 26/03/2013); 
“Cifuentes dice que los manifestantes “intentaban 
matar policías” y expediente a los impulsores del 
22M” [Cifuentes claims protestors “tried to kill po-
lice” and opens inquiry into 22M organizers] (Público, 
25/03/2013).
6. For the symbolic effects of police action on those who 
did participate directly in these demonstrations - both 
protesters and police - see Camps and Vergés 2015.
7. “Aumenta un 1.780% el gasto en materia antidisturbios 
y protección” [1,780% increase in spending on riot po-
lice and protection materials] (El Mundo, 5/11/2013); 
“Nace la unidad ‘bronce’ para apoyar a los antidistur-
bios” [The “bronze” unit is born to support riot police] 
(El País, 21/11/2012).
8. The bureaucratic field is a Bourdieusian concept 
employed in order to avoid portraying the state as 
a power tool at the service of the ruling class. This 
concept is used to stress the existence of a space of 
struggles in which different groups and logics com-
pete for the power associated to the capacity of us-
ing the legitimate means to exert both physical and 
symbolic violence (see Bourdieu 2012; Wacquant 
2009: 289-290).
9. Although you can limit people’s rights for merely be-
ing members of legally constructed groups. This is the 
case of foreign people subject to immigration laws in 
Spain, which make it possible for people to be exclud-
ed from political participation and from recognition as 
“citizens”.
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